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Abstract
We show that a global imbalance risk factor that captures the spread in countriesexternal
imbalances and their propensity to issue external liabilities in foreign currency explains the
cross-sectional variation in currency excess returns. The economic intuition is simple: net
debtor countries o¤er a currency risk premium to compensate investors willing to nance
negative external imbalances because their currencies depreciate in bad times. This mechanism
is consistent with exchange rate theory based on capital ows in imperfect nancial markets.
We also nd that the global imbalance factor is priced in cross sections of other major asset
markets.
Keywords: Currency Risk Premium; Global Imbalances; Foreign Exchange Excess Returns;
Carry Trade.
JEL Classication: F31; F37; G12; G15.
1 Introduction
Imbalances in trade and capital ows have been the centerpiece of much debate surrounding
the causes and consequences of the global nancial crisis. Therefore it would seem natural
that, given the nancial crisis consisted of collapsing asset prices worldwide, global imbalances
may help shed light on our fundamental understanding of asset price dynamics. The foreign
exchange (FX) market provides a logical starting point for testing this hypothesis as exchange
rate uctuations and currency risk premia are theoretically linked to external imbalances, and
recent events in the FX market provide a reminder of the potential importance of such a
link. For example, following the US Federal Reserves announcement on 22 May 2013 that it
would taper the size of their bond-buying programme, emerging market currencies including
the Indian rupee, Brazilian real, South African rand and Turkish lira all sold-o¤ sharply. A
common characteristic among these four countries is that they are some of the worlds largest
debtor nations. In fact, the Financial Times on 26 June 2013 attributed the large depreciation
of the Indian rupee (which fell by 22% against the US dollar between May and August 2013)
to investorsconcerns over India being one of the most vulnerable emerging market currencies
due to its current account decit(Ross, 2013).
In this paper we provide empirical evidence that exposure to countriesexternal imbalances
is key to understanding currency risk premia.1 Our ndings are consistent with the broad im-
plications of portfolio balance models, which emphasize the role of capital ows for exchange
rate determination when assets denominated in di¤erent currencies are not perfectly substi-
tutable. A recent notable example is the model of Gabaix and Maggiori (hereafter GM, 2015),
who provide a novel theory of exchange rate determination based on capital ows in imperfect
nancial markets. Specically, GM (2015) propose a two-country model in which exchange
rates are jointly determined by global imbalances and nanciersrisk-bearing capacity. In their
model, countries run trade imbalances and nanciers absorb the resultant currency risk, i.e.,
1The results also support a risk-based interpretation of the carry trade, a popular strategy that borrows
in currencies with low interest rates (funding currencies) and lends in currencies with high interest rates
(investment currencies). See Hansen and Hodrick (1980), Bilson (1981), Fama (1984), Lustig and Verdelhan
(2007), Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2009), Della Corte, Sarno and Tsiakas (2009), Burnside (2011),
Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski and Rebelo (2011), Christiansen, Ranaldo and Söderlind (2011), Lustig,
Roussanov and Verdelhan (2011), Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling and Schrimpf (2012a), Jurek (2014), Lettau,
Maggiori and Weber (2014), Bekaert and Panayotov (2015), Farhi, Fraiberger, Gabaix, Ranciere and Verdelhan
(2015), and Koijen, Moskowitz, Pedersen and Vrugt (2015).
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nanciers are long the debtor country and short the creditor country. Financiers, however,
are nancially constrained and this a¤ects their ability to take positions. Intuitively, if there
is little risk-bearing capacity nanciers are unwilling to intermediate currency mismatches re-
gardless of the excess return on o¤er. In contrast, when nanciers have unlimited risk-bearing
capacity they are willing to take positions in currencies whenever a positive excess return is
available, and hence the currency risk premium is miniscule. While this paper is not a direct
test of the GM theory, our key results can be interpreted naturally under the description of
exchange rate determination o¤ered in this theory.
We focus the empirical analysis around two simple testable hypotheses, which we motivate
in Section 2. First, currency excess returns are higher when the funding (investment) country
is a net foreign creditor (debtor) and has a higher propensity to issue liabilities denominated
in domestic (foreign) currency. The relation between currency excess returns and net foreign
assets captures the link between external imbalances and currency risk premia in the theory
of GM (2015). The currency denomination of external debt also matters for currency risk
premia. One argument why this may be the case, borrowed from the original sinliterature
(e.g., Eichengreen and Hausmann, 2005), is that countries which cannot issue debt in their
own currency are riskier. In essence, this rst testable hypothesis suggests that currency risk
premia are driven by the evolution and currency denomination of net foreign assets.
Second, we test the prediction of the GM (2015) theory that, when there is a nancial dis-
ruption (i.e., risk-bearing capacity is very low and global risk aversion is very high), net-debtor
countries experience a currency depreciation, unlike net-creditor countries. This testable hy-
pothesis makes clear an important part of the mechanism that generates currency risk premia:
investors demand a risk premium for holding net debtor countriescurrencies because these
currencies perform poorly in bad times, which are times of large shocks to global risk aversion.
After describing the data and portfolio construction methods in Section 3, we test and
provide empirical evidence in support of the two hypotheses described above. With respect
to the rst testable hypothesis, we document in Section 4 that a currency strategy that sorts
currencies on net foreign asset positions and a countrys propensity to issue external liabilities
in domestic currency  termed the global imbalance strategy  generates a large spread
in returns. Then, in Section 5 we empirically test whether a global imbalance risk factor
explains the cross-section of currency excess returns in a standard asset pricing framework.
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The global imbalance risk factor termed the IMB factor, or simply IMB is equivalent
to the return from a high-minus-low strategy that buys the currencies of debtor nations with
mainly foreign currency denominated external liabilities (the riskiest currencies) and sells the
currencies of creditor nations with mainly domestic currency denominated external liabilities
(the safest currencies). Our central result in this respect is that IMB explains a large fraction
of the cross-sectional variation in currency excess returns, thus supporting a risk-based view of
exchange rate determination that is based on macroeconomic fundamentals and, specically,
on net foreign asset positions. This result holds both for a broad sample of 55 currencies and
for a subsample of 15 developed currencies over the period from 1983 to 2014.2
The economic intuition of this factor is simple: investors demand a risk premium to hold
the currency of net debtor countries, especially if the debt is funded principally in foreign
currency. For example, high interest rate currencies load positively on the global imbalance
factor, and thus deliver low returns in bad times when there is a spike in global risk aversion
and the process of international nancial adjustment requires their depreciation. Low interest
rate currencies are negatively related to the global imbalance factor, and thus provide a hedge
by yielding positive returns in bad times. This result suggests that returns to carry trades
are compensation for time-varying fundamental risk, and thus carry traders can be viewed as
taking on global imbalance risk. Importantly, the explanatory power of the global imbalance
risk factor is not conned to portfolios sorted on interest rate di¤erentials (i.e., carry trade
portfolios) and other interest rate sorts but extends to a broad cross section of currency
portfolios which includes, among others, portfolio sorts on currency value, momentum, and
volatility risk premia.
We also document how net foreign asset positions contain information that is (related but)
not identical to interest rate di¤erentials in the cross section of currencies. A regression of the
IMB factor on the carry (or slope) factor of Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan (2011) pro-
duces clear evidence that the two factors are signicantly di¤erent from each other, although
they are positively related. The main di¤erence between sorting on interest rate di¤erentials
(carry trade strategy) and sorting on global imbalances (global imbalance strategy) is in the
2There have hardly been any attempts to relate currency risk premia cross-sectionally to currenciessen-
sitivity to external imbalances, and existing evidence is conned to time series analysis (e.g., Alquist and
Chinn, 2008; Della Corte, Sarno and Sestieri, 2012). It thus seems quite natural to employ a cross-sectional
perspective on the role of global imbalances to help us understand currency risk premia.
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long portfolios of the two strategies: the riskiest countries in terms of net foreign asset posi-
tions are not necessarily the countries with the highest interest rates. Furthermore, our asset
pricing tests show that the global imbalance risk factor has pricing power in the cross-section
of currency excess returns even when conditioning on the carry risk factor. These ndings sup-
port GMs (2015) prediction that there is an e¤ect of net foreign asset positions on currency
excess returns that is distinct from a pure interest rate channel.3
In relation to the second testable hypothesis, in Section 6 we provide evidence using a
battery of panel regressions that in bad times (dened as times of risk aversion shocks, proxied
by the change in implied FX volatility) net-debtor countries experience a currency depreciation,
unlike net-creditor countries. This result is consistent with the risk premium story of GM
(2015): investors demand a risk premium for holding net debtor countriescurrencies because
these currencies perform poorly in bad times.
Further analysis in Section 7 provides renements and robustness of the main results. For
example, in this analysis we test the pricing power of the IMB factor for cross-sections of
returns in other markets, including equities, bonds and commodities. The results suggest that
the IMB factor is also priced in these asset markets. Overall, this additional analysis corrob-
orates the core nding that global imbalance risk is a key fundamental driver of risk premia
in the FX market. Finally, we briey summarize our key ndings in Section 8. A separate
Internet Appendix provides further details on the data, robustness tests and additional results.
2 Theoretical Motivation and Testable Hypotheses
The contribution of this paper is purely empirical, but our analysis has a clear theoretical
foundation within the class of models centered around the portfolio balance theory. The
seminal work in the development of this theory is often attributed to Kouri (1976), who
establishes a link between the balance of payments and exchange rates in a setting where assets
are imperfect substitutes, while risk averse investors are assumed to desire a diversied portfolio
of risky securities. It follows that any deviation between the expected return on domestic and
foreign bonds leads to amarginal, rather than total, transfer of wealth between assets. The risk
3This result is also consistent with the empirical work of Habib and Stracca (2012), who nd that net foreign
assets are particularly useful for predicting exchange rate returns in regressions which control for interest rate
di¤erentials.
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aversion of investors, combined with the assumption that real sector adjustments are slower
than for the nancial sector, mean that uncovered interest rate parity fails to hold within the
model. Instead, a domestic current account decit (capital account surplus) is associated with
a depreciation of the domestic currency.
Despite the early research breakthroughs relating to the portfolio balance model (e.g.,
Branson, Halttunen and Masson, 1979; Branson and Henderson, 1985), a combination of
insu¢ cient data on foreign bond holdings, a lack of micro-foundation in deriving the asset-
demand functions and an early body of evidence documenting a weak relationship between
the balance of payments and exchange rate returns has led to a steady and prolonged decline
in the research agenda. Recently GM (2015) provide a modern micro-founded version of the
portfolio balance model by incorporating an interaction between capital ows and nancial
intermediariesrisk-bearing capacity in imperfect nancial markets.
A distinct feature of the GM model is that global imbalances are a key driver of currency
risk premia: net debtor currencies are predicted to warrant an excess currency return in
equilibrium and to depreciate at times when risk-bearing capacity falls. In their two-period
model termed the Gammamodel each country borrows or lends in its own currency and
global nancial intermediaries absorb the exchange rate risk arising from imbalanced capital
ows. Since nancial intermediaries demand compensation for holding currency risk in the
form of an expected currency appreciation, exchange rates are jointly determined by global
capital ows and by the intermediariesrisk-bearing capacity, which GM (2015) refer to as
broadly dened risk aversion shocksand show that it depends on conditional FX volatility.
GM (2015, equation (23), Proposition 6) derive the expected currency excess return as
follows:
E (RX) =  
R
R
E (imp1)  imp0
(R +  ) imp0 + R

R
E (imp1)
(1)
where E() is the expectation operator, and RX is the dollar excess return. The variable impt
denotes the dollar value of US imports at time t; with exports normalized to unity in equation
(1), E (imp1)  imp0 determines the evolution of net exports. In the basic Gamma model with
two periods and two countries, this setting implies a positive relation between the evolution
of net exports and net foreign assets since the external account must balance at the end of
the last period. R and R are the domestic and foreign riskless interest rates.   captures risk-
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bearing capacity of nanciers. When risk-bearing capacity is low (i.e.,   is high), nancial
intermediaries are unwilling to absorb any imbalances, regardless of the expected excess return
available, and hence no nancial ows are necessary as trade inows and outows will be equal
in each period. As risk-bearing capacity increases (  decreases), expected excess returns fall
but do not entirely disappear, except when   is extremely low and nancial intermediaries
are prepared to absorb any currency imbalance so that uncovered interest rate parity holds.
Equation (1) shows that expected excess returns will be higher when interest rate di¤erentials
are larger (carry trade), and when the funding (investment) currency is issued by a net creditor
(debtor) country. Put another way, currency investors require a premium to hold the currency
of debtor nations relative to creditor nations.4
The Gamma model makes the simplifying assumption that each country borrows or lends
in its own currency, but in practice most countries do not (or cannot) issue all their debt in
their own currency. This fact is studied in the vast literature on the original sinhypothesis
(e.g., Eichengreen and Hausmann, 2005, and the references therein). Although GM (2015)
do not provide a full analytical extension of their model that allows for currency mismatches
between assets and liabilities, in Proposition 12 (point 3) they consider the impact of pre-
existing stocks of debt and their currency denomination, illustrating how this generates a
valuation channel to the external adjustment of countries whereby the exchange rate moves
in a way that facilitates the re-equilibration of external imbalances. GM (2015) highlight how
this mechanism is consistent with the valuation channel to external adjustment studied by
Gourinchas and Rey (2007), Gourinchas (2008), and Lane and Shambaugh (2010), and gives
a role to the currency denomination of external liabilities. We note, however, that short of a
full analytical description of the causal structure of foreign currency denominated debt, which
is not provided by GM (2015), one cannot dismiss possible endogeneity concerns as to why
countries issue debt in foreign currencies. Riskier countries may be forced to issue a higher
proportion of foreign currency denominated debt due to, for example, political instability or
4To clarify these e¤ects analytically in equation (1), rst consider the case when R=R > 1, i.e., the interest
rate in the foreign (investment) country is higher than the one in the funding country (the US). GM show
that @E(RX)@(R R) > 0, which means that the expected currency excess return increases with higher interest rate
di¤erentials. Second, set E [imp1]  imp0 > 0 (while setting R=R = 1), i.e., the funding country (the US) is
a net foreign creditor. Given that imp is the value of US imports in US dollars, E [imp1]  imp0 > 0 implies
that the US is expected to become a net importer at t = 1 in order to o¤set its positive external imbalance at
t = 0, and clearly @E(RX)@(E(imp1) imp0) > 0. This establishes the result that the expected excess return is higher if
the country of the funding currency is a net creditor, and viceversa for net debtor countries.
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ination-induced expropriation risks. With these caveats in mind, in our empirical analysis we
account for the impact of foreign currency denominated debt by considering whether currencies
of countries with a higher propensity to issue liabilities in foreign currency o¤er a higher
currency risk premium, given that such countries require much sharper depreciations to correct
their external imbalances.5
The mechanism described above implies the rst testable hypothesis, which is a variant
of Proposition 6 in GM (2015) with the additional condition that captures the e¤ect of the
currency denomination of liabilities.
Hypothesis 1 The expected currency excess return is bigger when (i) the interest rate dif-
ferential is larger, (ii) the funding (investment) country is a net foreign creditor (debtor), and
(iii) the funding (investment) country has a higher propensity to issue liabilities denominated
in domestic (foreign) currency.
This testable prediction suggests that, in addition to interest rate di¤erentials (condition
(i)) which have been analyzed extensively in the literature, FX excess returns are driven by
the evolution of external debt and its currency denomination (conditions (ii) and (iii)). In
our portfolio analysis, we focus on this aspect of Hypothesis 1 and combine the information in
conditions (ii) and (iii) to capture both the spread in external imbalances and the propensity
to issue external liabilities in foreign currency. We also examine their separate e¤ects in some
of our tests and in the regression analysis.
We test Hypothesis 1 in several ways. Above all, we form portfolios sorted on external
imbalances (net foreign assets to GDP ratio) and the share of foreign liabilities in domestic
currency to examine whether they provide predictive information for the cross-section of cur-
rency excess returns. We show that this portfolio sort generates a sizable and statistically
signicant spread in returns: a currency strategy that buys the extreme net debtor countries
with the highest propensity to issue external liabilities in foreign currency and sells the extreme
creditor countries with the lowest propensity to issue liabilities in foreign currency which we
term the global imbalancestrategy generates Sharpe ratios of 0.59 for a universe of major
countries and 0.68 for a broader set of 55 countries. This conrms the essence of Hypothesis
1, that currency excess returns are higher for net-debtor countries with higher propensity to
5This is because the initial depreciation makes countries with foreign-currency denominated liabilities
poorer, not richer, by increasing their debt burden; see the portfolio balance theory in Gourinchas (2008,
Section 3.2.2).
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issue liabilities in foreign currency. We also show that the returns from the global imbalance
strategy are related to but di¤erent from carry trade returns, consistent with the notion that
external imbalances partly capture di¤erent information from interest rate di¤erentials.
A central mechanism in the model of GM (2015) is that during periods of nancial distress,
when risk-bearing capacity declines, debtor countries su¤er a currency depreciation, unlike
creditor countries. This is indeed the logic that rationalizes why net debtor countries must
o¤er a currency risk premium, implying the second empirical prediction we take to the data,
which is Proposition 2 of GM (2015).
Hypothesis 2 When there is a nancial disruption (  increases), countries that are net
external debtors experience a currency depreciation, while the opposite is true for net-creditor
countries.
This prediction follows naturally from the previous analysis and our empirical results pro-
vide supporting evidence on its validity through the estimation of a battery of panel regressions.
Some caveats are in order on the theoretical motivation for our empirical work. First,
in the empirical analysis we use implied volatility indices for FX (VXY) and equity markets
(VIX) to capture global risk aversion, but do not provide direct evidence that these proxies
are in fact driven by the wealth of nancial intermediaries. GM (2015) state that conditional
volatility drives risk-bearing capacity, but we do not have a direct measure for this concept,
and VXY and VIX may well be capturing many other things. Second, within the GM (2015)
model, interest rates are modelled statically, as the inverse of the investor time preferences. An
extended model could incorporate global imbalances as one of the nancial drivers of interest
rates and by doing so generate a positive albeit imperfect correlation between imbalances and
interest rates. Third, as mentioned earlier, for tractability reasons GM (2015) assume that
countries can borrow and lend only in their own currencies and hence a full analytical treatment
of the decision to issue debt in foreign currency is not provided. However, our empirical work
does not make this assumption and we use the share of external liabilities issued in foreign
currency to rene our empirical characterization of the riskiness of global imbalances. Fourth,
it may be that our empirical ndings can be rationalized by other theories, even in a complete
markets setting. In fact, Colacito, Croce, Gavazzoni and Ready (2015) have recently developed
a frictionless risk-sharing model of the international economy with recursive preferences and
long-run risk, which is specically designed and able to replicate simultaneously the properties
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of the carry factor of Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan (2011) and the global imbalance risk
factor proposed in our paper.
To be clear, therefore, it is not our purpose to discriminate between alternative theories
capable of rationalizing our ndings or to provide a test of the theory of GM (2015); we
simply use that theory as a modern example of the portfolio balance approach to exchange rate
determination, in order to construct testable and economically plausible empirical hypotheses.
This paper then aims at providing a robust empirical assessment of these hypotheses in order
to show novel facts about the link between global imbalances and currency risk premia.
3 Data and Currency Portfolios
This section describes the main data employed in the empirical analysis. We also describe the
construction of currency portfolios and the global imbalance risk factor.
Data on Currency Excess Returns. We collect daily spot and 1-month forward
exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar (USD) from Barclays and Reuters via Datastream.
Exchange rates are dened as units of US dollars per unit of foreign currency so that an
increase in the exchange rate indicates an appreciation of the foreign currency. The analysis
uses monthly data obtained by sampling end-of-month rates from October 1983 to June 2014.
The sample comprises 55 countries, and we call this sample all countries. Since many
currencies in this broad sample are pegged or subject to capital restrictions at various points
in time, we also consider a subset of 15 countries which we refer to as developed countries.
The list of countries is in the Internet Appendix, which also provides further details about the
FX data.
We dene spot and forward exchange rates at time t as St and Ft, respectively, and take into
account the standard value date conventions in matching the forward rate with the appropriate
spot rate (see Bekaert and Hodrick, 1993). The excess return on buying a foreign currency in
the forward market at time t and then selling it in the spot market at time t+ 1 is computed
as
RXt+1 =
(St+1   Ft)
St
; (2)
9
which is equivalent to the spot exchange rate return minus the forward premium
RXt+1 =
St+1   St
St
  Ft   St
St
: (3)
According to the CIP condition, the forward premium approximately equals the interest rate
di¤erential. Since CIP holds closely in the data (e.g., Akram, Rime, and Sarno, 2008), the
currency excess return is approximately equal to the exchange rate return plus the di¤erential
of the foreign interest rate and the US interest rate. As a matter of convenience, throughout
this paper we refer to fdt = (St   Ft) =St as the forward discount or interest rate di¤erential
relative to the US. We construct currency excess returns adjusted for transaction costs using
bid-ask quotes on spot and forward rates. We describe in the Internet Appendix the exact
calculation of the net returns.
Data on External Assets and Liabilities. Turning to macroeconomic data, we obtain
end-of-year series on foreign assets and liabilities, and gross domestic product (GDP) from
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004, 2007), kindly updated by Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti. Foreign
(or external) assets are measured as the dollar value of assets a country owns abroad, while
foreign (or external) liabilities refer to the dollar value of domestic assets owned by foreigners.
The data for all countries included in our study are until the end of 2012. For each country
we measure external imbalances the indebtedness of a country to foreigners using the net
foreign asset position (the di¤erence between foreign assets and foreign liabilities) relative to
the size of the economy (GDP), which we denote nfa. We retrieve monthly observations by
keeping end-of-period data constant until a new observation becomes available.
We also use end-of-year series on the proportion of external liabilities denominated in
domestic currency (denoted ldc) from Benetrix, Lane and Shambaugh (2015), which updates
the data from Lane and Shambaugh (2010), kindly provided by Philip Lane. Clearly, measuring
accurately the share of external liabilities in foreign currency is a very hard task, also because
of the well-known di¢ culties in gathering data on derivatives positions. These data are, to
the best of our knowledge, the only ones available for this purpose that cover a large sample
of countries over a long span of time, from 1990 to 2012. We construct monthly observations
by keeping end-of-period data constant until a new observation becomes available. Note that
we maintain the 1990 proportions back until 1983.6
6This assumption makes no qualitative di¤erence to our ndings as when we examine the sample period
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Global Imbalance Portfolios. Motivated by the considerations discussed in Section 2,
we construct global imbalance portfolios as follows: at the end of each period t, we rst group
currencies into two baskets using our key sorting variable, i.e. nfa, then reorder currencies
within each basket using ldc. Hence, we allocate this set of currencies to ve portfolios
so that Portfolio 1 corresponds to creditor countries whose external liabilities are primarily
denominated in domestic currency (safest currencies), whereas Portfolio 5 comprises debtor
countries whose external liabilities are primarily denominated in foreign currency (riskiest
currencies). We refer to these portfolios as the global imbalance portfolios. As for all other
currency portfolios we consider, we compute the excess return for each portfolio as an equally
weighted average of the currency excess returns within that portfolio and, for the purpose of
computing portfolio returns net of transaction costs, we assume that investors go short foreign
currencies in Portfolio 1 and long foreign currencies in the remaining portfolios. We construct
the global imbalance (IMB) risk factor as the di¤erence between Portfolio 5 and Portfolio 1.
Figure 1 claries the outcome of our sequential sorting procedure. Note that the procedure
does not guarantee monotonicity in both sorting variables (nfa and ldc) because Portfolio
3 contains both low and high ldc countries. However, the corner portfolios contain the in-
tended set of countries: specically, Portfolio 1 contains the extreme 20% of all currencies
with high nfa and high ldc (creditor nations with external liabilities mainly in domestic cur-
rency) whereas Portfolio 5 contains the top 20% of all currencies with low nfa and low ldc
(debtor nations with external liabilities mainly in foreign currency). We use ve portfolios
rather than six, as we have a limited number of currencies in the developed countries sample
and at the beginning of the all countries sample, while we also want to have the same number
of portfolios for both samples of countries. In the Internet Appendix we show that our core
results are qualitatively identical if we use 4 portfolios for developed countries and 6 portfolios
for all countries; see Figure A.1 and Table A.14 in the Internet Appendix.
Carry Trade Portfolios. We construct ve carry trade portfolios, rebalanced monthly,
following the recent literature in this area (e.g., Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan, 2011). We
use them as test assets in our empirical asset pricing analysis, alongside a number of other
currency portfolios. At the end of each period t, we allocate currencies to ve portfolios on the
starting in 1990 (dropping the rst 7 years of data altogether) our portfolio results are qualitatively identical.
This is not surprising since ldc is a highly persistent variable (see Benetrix, Lane and Shambaugh, 2015).
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basis of their forward discounts. This exercise implies that currencies with the lowest forward
discounts (or lowest interest rate di¤erential relative to the US) are assigned to Portfolio 1,
whereas currencies with the highest forward discounts (or highest interest rate di¤erential
relative to the US) are assigned to Portfolio 5. The strategy that is long Portfolio 5 and short
Portfolio 1 is referred to as the CAR factor, or simply CAR.
Momentum Portfolios. Following Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2012b),
at the end of each month t we form ve portfolios based on exchange rate returns over the
previous k months. We assign the 20% of all currencies with the lowest lagged exchange
rate returns to Portfolio 1 (loser currencies), and the 20% of all currencies with the highest
lagged exchange rate returns to Portfolio 5 (winner currencies). We construct ve short-term
momentum (k = 3 months) and ve long-term momentum (k = 12 months) portfolios.
Value Portfolios. At the end of each period t, we form ve portfolios based on the
lagged 5-year real exchange rate return as in Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013). We
assign the 20% of all currencies with the highest lagged real exchange rate return to Portfolio
1 (overvalued currencies), and the 20% of all currencies with the lowest lagged real exchange
rate return to Portfolio 5 (undervalued currencies).
Term Spread and Long Yields Portfolios. We also construct ve currency portfolios
sorted on the term spread of interest rates, and ve currency portfolios sorted on the long-term
interest rate di¤erential relative to the US, thus using additional information about interest
rates. We collect 3-month interest rates as proxy for short-term rates, and 10-year interest rates
(or 5-year when 10-year is not available) to capture the long-term rates from Global Financial
Data. Sorting on the term spread is motivated by the evidence in Ang and Chen (2010), while
sorting on long-term interest rates is useful to capture departures from uncovered interest rate
parity at the longer end of the term structure of interest rates (e.g., Bekaert, Wei and Xing,
2007). At the end of each month t, similar to the previous strategies, we sort currencies into
ve portfolios using either the term spread or the long-term interest rate di¤erential. We
assign the 20% of all currencies with the lowest term spread (lowest long-term interest rate
di¤erential) to Portfolio 1, and the 20% of all currencies with the highest term spread (highest
long-term interest rate di¤erential) to Portfolio 5. This gives us ve portfolios sorted on the
term spread, and ve portfolios sorted on the long-term interest rate di¤erential.
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Risk Reversal Portfolios. At the end of each month t, we form ve currency portfolios
using the 1-year implied volatility of currency option risk-reversals. For this exercise, we
update the implied volatility of currency options quoted over-the-counter used by Della Corte,
Ramadorai and Sarno (2015), who study the properties of this strategy in order to capture a
skewness risk premium in FX markets. For each currency in each time period, we construct
the 25-delta risk reversal, which is the implied volatility of an option strategy that buys a
25-delta out-of-the-money call and sells a 25-delta out-of-the-money put with 1-year maturity.
We then construct ve portfolios and assign the 20% of all currencies with the highest risk
reversal to Portfolio 1 (low-skewness currencies), and the 20% of all currencies with the lowest
risk reversal to Portfolio 5 (high-skewness currencies). Finally, we compute the excess return
for each portfolio as an equally weighted average of the currency excess returns (based on spot
and forward exchange rates) within that portfolio.
Volatility Risk Premium Portfolios. At the end of each period t, we group currencies
into ve portfolios using their 1-year volatility risk premium as described in Della Corte, Ra-
madorai and Sarno (2015). The volatility risk premium is dened as the di¤erence between the
physical and the risk-neutral expectations of future realized volatility. Following Bollerslev,
Tauchen, and Zhou (2009), we proxy the physical expectation of future realized volatility at
time t by simply using the lagged 1-year realized volatility based on daily log returns. This
approach requires no modeling assumptions and is consistent with the stylized fact that re-
alized volatility is a highly persistent process. The risk-neutral expectation of the future
realized volatility at time t is constructed using the model-free approach of Britten-Jones and
Neuberger (2000) which employs the implied volatility of 1-year currency options across ve
di¤erent deltas, i.e., 10-delta call and put, 25-delta call and put, and at-the-money options.
The volatility risk premium reects the costs of insuring against currency volatility uctua-
tions and is generally negative. We construct ve portfolios and allocate 20% of all currencies
with the lowest volatility risk premia to Portfolio 1 (expensive volatility insurance currencies),
and 20% of all currencies with the highest volatility risk premia to Portfolio 5 (cheap volatility
insurance currencies). We then compute the excess return for each portfolio as an equally
weighted average of the currency excess returns (based on spot and forward exchange rates)
within that portfolio.
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We have described above 9 currency strategies for a total of 45 portfolios. These strategies
are rebalanced monthly and the sample runs from October 1983 to June 2014. The sample
for the risk reversal and volatility risk premium portfolios, however, starts in January 1996
due to options data availability. These portfolios, for both sample periods analyzed, display a
correlation ranging from just over 30% to over 90%, with the average being around 70%. This
broad set of portfolios goes well beyond carry or interest rate-sorted portfolios, and will form
our test assets in the asset pricing analysis.
4 The Global Imbalance Strategy and the Carry Trade
4.1 Portfolio Returns and the IMB Factor
This section describes the properties of the currency excess returns from implementing the
global imbalance strategy and constructing the IMB factor. In Table 1 we present summary
statistics for the ve global imbalance portfolios sorted on nfa and ldc, as well as for the global
imbalance factor IMB. The average excess return tends to increase from the rst portfolio
(0:92% and 0:67% per annum) to the last portfolio (5:32% and 4:65% per annum) for both
samples. When we compare the Sharpe ratio (SR) of the global imbalance strategy to the SR
of the carry trade strategy (see Table A.1 in the Internet Appendix), we observe that the global
imbalance strategy has a Sharpe ratio that is at least as high as the carry trade strategy: 0.68
compared to 0.65 for all countries, and 0.59 compared to 0.43 for developed countries. This
comparison suggests that the global imbalance strategy has appealing risk-adjusted returns in
its own right, which is perhaps surprising given the information required to update the global
imbalance strategy arrives only once a year.7
The last three rows in Table 1 report the average fd, nfa, and ldc across all portfolios.
The spread in interest rate di¤erentials is about 7% and 3.5% for all countries and developed
countries, which is a large spread but far less than the 11% and 6% reported for the carry
trade in Table A.1. This suggests that part of the return from the global imbalance strategy
is clearly related to carry (interest rate information), but part of it is driven by a di¤erent
7Specically, we construct monthly excess returns but global imbalance portfolios are in practice rebalanced
only at the end of each year when new information on nfa and ldc becomes available. In contrast, carry trade
portfolios are rebalanced every month as information on forward discounts is available monthly. The impact of
this di¤erence is conrmed by the frequency of currency portfolio switches (Freq), which displays less variation
for the global imbalance portfolios than the carry trade portfolios.
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source of predictability which is in external imbalances but not in interest rate di¤erentials.
The last two rows reveal that there is a sizable spread in nfa and ldc, which is monotonic for
nfa in both samples of countries examined and is much larger than the corresponding spread
for carry trade portfolios.
Overall, the currencies of net debtor countries with a relatively higher propensity to issue
external liabilities in foreign currency have higher (risk-adjusted) returns than the currencies of
net creditor countries with higher propensity to issue liabilities in domestic currency, consistent
with Hypothesis 1 stated in Section 2.
4.2 IMB versus CAR
Since sorting on nfa and ldc delivers a set of portfolios with increasing interest rate di¤er-
entials, one may wonder whether IMB captures anything more than CAR. To investigate
this we rst regress the IMB factor on the CAR factor and a constant term; in an additional
regression, we also control for the 12-month lag of the dependent variable to account for po-
tential serial correlation in the IMB factor (recall that the raw information about nfa and ldc
is updated at the annual frequency). The results, reported in Panel A of Table 2, indicate that
the slope coe¢ cient () estimate on CAR is positive and statistically signicant, but is far
and statistically di¤erent from unity (approximately 0.40). The R2 of the contemporaneous
regression of IMB on CAR is 30%. Most importantly, the constant term () is statistically
di¤erent from zero in all specications and economically sizable (up to 2.3% per annum), sug-
gesting that IMB and CAR are di¤erent from each other. Indeed, the null hypothesis that
 = 0 and  = 1 (i.e., the null that IMB = CAR) is strongly rejected.
To further rene our understanding of the di¤erences between these two portfolio sorts, we
then run regressions of the ve global imbalance portfolios on the CAR factor and a constant
term, again allowing for a 12-month lag of the dependent variable in separate regressions. The
results, reported in Panel B of Table 2, suggest that there is a moderate spread in the coe¢ cient
on the CAR factor, which is often statistically signicant. The  in the regression is generally
statistically insignicant, except in Portfolios 4 and 5 for the sample of all countries and in
Portfolio 5 for the sample of developed countries. Hence the di¤erence between the global
imbalance strategy and the carry trade strategy arises mainly from the long leg of the strategies
(i.e., Portfolio 5): this means that, while sorting on global imbalances produces portfolios with
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increasing interest rates, the countries with the worst global imbalance positions (in terms of
net foreign assets and the currency denomination of foreign debt) are not necessarily the
countries with the highest interest rates. This is also apparent when examining the identity
of the currencies that enter the long leg of the two strategies (see Table A.2 in the Internet
Appendix), which reveals, for example, that currencies like the Danish krone or the Swedish
krona are among the top six in Portfolio 5 of the global imbalance strategy due to their weak
net foreign asset positions over much of the sample. Typical carry currencies like the Brazilian
real or the South African rand do not even feature among the top six most frequent currencies
in the long leg of the global imbalance strategy.
Taken together, the results reported till now suggest that the global imbalance strategy
has creditable excess returns overall, and that these returns are positively but imperfectly
correlated with the returns from the carry trade. The lack of a perfect correlation is in line
with Hypothesis 1 and the predictions of GM (2015), which states that global imbalances
matter for the determination of currency risk premia regardless of the size of interest rate
di¤erentials. We now turn to a more rigorous investigation of the importance of global
imbalance risk using formal asset pricing tests applied to a broad set of currency portfolios.
5 Does Global Imbalance Risk Price Currency Excess
Returns?
This section presents cross-sectional asset pricing tests for currency portfolios and the global
imbalance risk factor, and empirically documents that global imbalance risk is priced in a
broad cross-section of currency portfolios. Also, we nd that the IMB factor is priced even
when controlling for the CAR factor of Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan (2011).
Methodology. We denote the discrete excess returns on portfolio j in period t as RXjt .
In the absence of arbitrage opportunities, risk-adjusted excess returns have a price of zero and
satisfy the following Euler equation:
Et[Mt+1RX
j
t+1] = 0 (4)
with a Stochastic Discount Factor (SDF) linear in the pricing factors ft+1, given by
Mt+1 = 1  b0 (ft+1   ) (5)
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where b is the vector of factor loadings, and  denotes the factor means. This specication
implies a beta pricing model where the expected excess return on portfolio j is equal to the
factor risk price  times the risk quantities j. The beta pricing model is dened as
E[RXj] = 0j (6)
where the market price of risk  = fb can be obtained via the factor loadings b. f =
E

(ft   ) (ft   )0

is the variance-covariance matrix of the risk factors, and j are the re-
gression coe¢ cients of each portfolios excess return RXjt+1 on the risk factors ft+1.
The factor loadings b entering equation (4) are estimated via the Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) of Hansen (1982). To implement GMM , we use the pricing errors as a
set of moments and a prespecied weighting matrix. Since the objective is to test whether
the model can explain the cross-section of expected currency excess returns, we only rely on
unconditional moments and do not employ instruments other than a constant and a vector of
ones. The rst-stage GMM estimation used here employs an identity weighting matrix, which
tells us how much attention to pay to each moment condition. With an identity matrix,
GMM attempts to price all currency portfolios equally well. The tables report estimates
of b and , and standard errors based on Newey and West (1987) with optimal lag length
selection set according to Andrews (1991). The models performance is then evaluated using
the cross-sectional R2 and the HJ distance measure of Hansen and Jagannathan (1997), which
quanties the mean-squared distance between the SDF of a proposed model and the set of
admissible SDFs. To test whether the HJ distance is statistically signicant, we simulate p-
values using a weighted sum of 21-distributed random variables (see Jagannathan and Wang,
1996; Ren and Shimotsu, 2009).
The estimation of equation (6) is also undertaken using a two-pass ordinary least squares
regression following Fama and MacBeth (1973), and a two-step GMM estimation. Our results,
however, are virtually identical and therefore we only present one-step GMM estimates below.8
Risk Factors and Pricing Kernel. The most recent literature on cross-sectional asset
pricing in currency markets has considered a two-factor SDF. The rst risk factor is the
8We also calculate the 2 test statistic for the null hypothesis that all cross-sectional pricing errors (i.e.,
the di¤erence between actual and predicted excess returns) are jointly equal to zero. The 2 test results are
perfectly in line with the HJ distance results, and therefore are not reported to conserve space.
17
expected market excess return, approximated by the average excess return on a portfolio
strategy that is long in all foreign currencies with equal weights and short in the domestic
currency the DOL factor. For the second risk factor, the literature has employed several
return-based factors such as the slope factor (essentially CAR) of Lustig, Roussanov, and
Verdelhan (2011) or the global volatility factor of Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling and Schrimpf
(2012a). Following this literature, we consider a two-factor SDF with DOL and IMB as risk
factors to assess the validity of the theoretical prediction in Hypothesis 1 that currencies more
exposed to global imbalance risk o¤er a higher risk premium. We also employ the two-factor
SDF with DOL and CAR as in Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan (2011), and a three-factor
SDF with DOL, CAR and IMB. The latter, three-factor SDF allows us to assess whether
IMB has any independent pricing power beyond CAR or simply mimicks information already
embedded in CAR. Moreover, in the Internet Appendix (Table A.17) we show that using the
global equity market excess return rather than DOL as the rst factor does not a¤ect our
results.
Cross-Sectional Regressions. Table 3 presents the cross-sectional asset pricing results.
The test assets include the following 35 currency portfolios for the sample from October
1983 to June 2014: 5 carry trade, 5 global imbalance, 5 short-term momentum and 5 long-
term momentum, 5 value, 5 term spread, and 5 long yields portfolios. For the sample from
January 1996 to June 2014, we augment the above set of test assets with 5 risk reversal and 5
volatility risk premium portfolios, yielding a total of 45 currency portfolios. Lewellen, Nagel
and Shanken (2010) show that a strong factor structure in test asset returns can give rise to
misleading results in empirical work. If the risk factor has a small (but non-zero) correlation
with the true factor, the cross-sectional R2 could still be high suggesting an impressive
model t. This is particularly problematic in small cross sections, and it is a key reason why
we employ such a broad set of currency portfolios rather than just focusing, for example, on
the 5 carry portfolios.
Since IMB is a tradable risk factor, its price of risk must equal its expected return, i.e.
the price of global imbalance risk cannot be a free parameter in estimation. When the test
assets include the global imbalance portfolios, this problem does not arise. However, when
the test assets do not include the global imbalance portfolios (such as the asset pricing tests
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conducted later in the paper on cross-sections of equity, bond and commodity portfolios) we
follow the suggestion of Lewellen, Nagel and Shanken (2010) and include the global imbalance
factor as one of the test assets. This e¤ectively means that we constrain the price of risk for
IMB to be equal to the mean return of the traded global imbalance portfolio. The same logic
applies to CAR.
The results from implementing asset pricing tests on the above cross sections of currency
portfolios as test assets are presented in Table 3, which reports estimates of factor loadings
b, the market prices of risk , the cross-sectional R2, and the HJ distance. Newey and West
(1987) corrected standard errors with lag length determined according to Andrews (1991) are
reported in parentheses. The p-values of the HJ distance measure is reported in brackets.
The results are reported for all three SDF specications described above, both for all countries
and for developed countries, and over two sample periods.
Starting from Panel A of Table 3, we focus our interest on the sign and the statistical
signicance of IMB, the market price of risk attached to the global imbalance risk factor. We
nd a positive and signicant estimate of IMB, in the range between 4% and 8% per annum
for all countries, and between 3% and 6% per annum for developed countries. The estimates
are very similar for both SDF specications involving the IMB factor, i.e. also when the SDF
includes CAR. A positive estimate of the factor price of global imbalance risk implies higher
risk premia for currency portfolios whose returns comove positively with the global imbalance
factor, and lower risk premia for currency portfolios exhibiting a negative covariance with
the global imbalance factor. The standard errors of the risk prices are approximately equal
to 1% for all estimations carried out. The price of risk associated with IMB is more than
two standard deviations from zero, and thus highly statistically signicant in each case. We
observe satisfactory cross-sectional t in terms of R2, which ranges from 49% to 65% for the
two-factor SDF that includesDOL and IMB. Further support in favor of the pricing power of
IMB comes from the fact that theHJ distance is insignicant. It is also worth noting that the
SDF specication with DOL and CAR (hence not including IMB), does well in pricing the
test assets, as CAR is statistically signicant, the R2 is satisfactory (albeit lower than the SDF
specications involving IMB), and the HJ distance is not signicant. However, the bottom
line for our purposes is that a simple two-factor model that includes IMB performs well in
pricing the cross-section of currency excess returns, and global imbalance risk is priced whether
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or not CAR is included as a risk factor in the model. In turn, the latter point corroborates the
results in the previous section, suggesting that there is some di¤erential information embedded
in IMB versus CAR.
Panel B of Table 3 reports the same information as Panel A for asset pricing tests conducted
on test assets that now exclude both carry trade and global imbalance portfolios; hence the
number of test assets is 25 from 1983, and 35 from 1996. This exercise is an interesting out-
of-sample test since we attempt to price currency portfolios that do not include the portfolios
from which IMB and CAR are constructed (although we do include the IMB and CAR
factors as test assets to ensure arbitrage-free estimates of IMB and CAR). The estimation
results reported in Panel B are qualitatively identical to the results in Panel A, indicating that
the pricing power of IMB recorded earlier is not driven simply by its ability to price global
imbalance and carry portfolios, but it clearly extends to other currency portfolios.9
Note that we do not argue that these two determinants of currency risk premia (global
imbalances and interest rate di¤erentials) are unrelated, only that they are imperfectly corre-
lated. It is well-documented that there is a cross-sectional correlation between interest rates
(typically real interest rates) and net foreign asset positions (e.g., Rose, 2010). In Table 4,
we present results from a cross-sectional regression of the nominal interest rate di¤erentials
used in our study on net foreign assets and the share of liabilities denominated in domestic
currency. These results show clearly that net foreign assets enter the regression with a strongly
statistically signicant coe¢ cient and with the expected sign: higher nfa is associated with
lower interest rates. The R2 is lower than one might expect, however, suggesting that there
may be important omitted variables in the regression. Indeed, when we add ination di¤eren-
tials and output gap di¤erentials to the regression, net foreign asset positions remain strongly
signicant, but the R2 increases dramatically, mainly due to ination di¤erentials.10 In short,
the main point is that, even though the information in global imbalances is related to inter-
est rate di¤erentials, there is independent information in global imbalances that matters for
currency returns.
9We also replace the dollar factor with the global equity factor (WEQ) which we proxy using the returns
on the MSCI World Index minus the 1-month US interest rate but asset pricing results remain qualitatevely
similar. We collect the data from Datastream and report the results in the Table A.17 in the Internet Appendix.
10Ination and the output gap are the core variables in macro models of the short-term interest rate,
commonly used in the Taylor ruleliterature. Note that the regressions in Table 4 are run for 53, rather than
55, countries due to di¢ culties in obtaining reliable data for the full sample for Greece and Venezuela.
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Portfolios based on IMB Betas. We provide evidence of the explanatory power of
the IMB factor for currency excess returns from a di¤erent viewpoint. We form portfolios
based on an individual currencys exposure to global imbalance risk, and investigate whether
these portfolios have similar return distributions to the global imbalance portfolios. If global
imbalance risk is a priced factor, then currencies sorted according to their exposure to global
imbalance risk should yield a cross section of portfolios with a signicant spread in average
currency returns.
We regress individual currency excess returns at time t on a constant and the global
imbalance risk factor using a 36-month rolling window that ends in period t   1, and denote
this slope coe¢ cient as iIMB;t. This exercise provides currency i exposure to IMB only using
information available at time t. We then rank currencies according to iIMB;t and allocate
them to ve portfolios at time t. Portfolio 1 contains the currencies with the largest negative
exposure to the global imbalance factor (lowest betas), while Portfolio 5 contains the most
positively exposed currencies (highest betas). Table 5 summarizes the descriptive statistics
for these portfolios. We nd that buying currencies with a low beta (i.e., insurance against
global imbalance risk) yields a signicantly lower return than buying currencies with a high
beta (i.e., high exposure to global imbalance risk). The spread between the last portfolio and
the rst portfolio is in excess of 5% per annum for both sets of countries. Average excess
returns generally increase, albeit not always monotonically, when moving from the rst to
the last portfolio. Moreover, we also nd a clear monotonic increase in both average pre-
formation and post-formation betas when moving from Portfolio 1 to Portfolio 5: they line up
well with the cross-section of average excess returns in Table 1. Average pre-formation betas
vary from  0:22 to 1:35 for all countries, and from  0:94 to 0:67 for developed countries.
Post-formation betas are calculated by regressing the realized excess returns of beta-sorted
portfolios on a constant and the global imbalance risk factor. These gures range from  0:06
to 0:69 for all countries, and from  0:29 to 0:82 for developed countries. Overall, these results
conrm that global imbalance risk is important for understanding the cross-section of currency
excess returns, providing further support to Hypothesis 1.
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6 Exchange Rates and Net Foreign Assets in Bad Times
We now turn to testing Hypothesis 2, as stated in Section 2. In essence, the testable prediction
from GM (2015) that we take to the data is that exchange rates are jointly determined by
global imbalances and nanciersrisk-bearing capacity so that net external debtors experience
a currency depreciation in bad times, which are times of large shocks to risk bearing capacity
and risk aversion (  is high in the model). In contrast, net external creditors experience a
currency appreciation in bad times.
In the model of GM (2015),   is driven by shocks to conditional FX volatility. We use the
change in the VXY index as a proxy for conditional FX volatility risk to proxy  , i.e. shocks
to the willingness of nanciers to absorb exchange rate risk. VXY is the FX analogue of the
VIX index, and is a tradable volatility index designed by JP Morgan. It measures aggregate
volatility in currencies through a simple, turnover-weighted index of G7 volatility based on
3-month at-the-money forward options. In general, GM (2015) refer to   as loosely proxying
for global risk aversion shocks, and therefore we also show in the Internet Appendix (Tables
A.6, A.7 and A.9) the robustness of our results using the change in VIX, a commonly used
proxy for global risk aversion in the empirical nance literature.11
We test Hypothesis 2 in two di¤erent ways. First, we estimate a panel regression where we
regress monthly exchange rate returns on a set of macro variables, allowing for xed e¤ects. As
right-hand-side variables, we employ nfa lagged by 12 months, and the interest rate di¤erential
lagged by 1 month. In some specications we also include ldc, and the change in VXY on its
own. Importantly, we also allow for an interaction term between nfa as well as the interest
rate di¤erential and the change in the VXY index (specication 1-2-3), or the change in VXY
times a dummy that is equal to unity when the change in VXY is greater than one standard
deviation and is zero otherwise (specications 4-5-6).12
11We use the change in VXY (or VIX) contemporaneously in these regressions in order to capture the
e¤ect of the shock on exchange rate returns predicted by Hypothesis 2, which states that net debtor countries
currencies depreciate on impact when risk aversion increases. An alternative interpretation of   might be that
it captures (changes in) the amount of capital available in nancial markets to bear risk. In this case one would
expect currency excess returns to decline as the amount of capital increases, and in fact there is evidence in
the literature that this is the case (e.g., Jylha and Suominen, 2011; Barroso and Santa-Clara, 2015). However,
our interpretation of   is, much like GM (2015), that it reects shocks to risk aversion and hence the change
in VXY seems a reasonable proxy, as does the VIX. Indeed, Bekaert, Hoerova and Lo Duca (2013) nd that
a large component of the VIX index is driven by factors associated with time-varying risk aversion.
12We also add a constant, and the lagged exchange rate return as a control variable. Because of the constant
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The key variable of interest in these regressions is the interaction term between nfa and
the change in VXY. Given our variable denitions, Hypothesis 2 requires a positive coe¢ cient
on this variable, which would imply that at times when risk aversion increases (as proxied
by the change in VXY) countries with larger net foreign asset positions to GDP experience
a currency appreciation, whereas the currencies of countries with larger net debtor positions
depreciate. The results, reported in Table 6, indicate that this is the case as the interaction
term is positive and strongly statistically signicant in all regression specications, even when
controlling for the interest rate di¤erential, the change in VXY and the other control variables
described above. It is instructive to note that the change in VXY also enters signicantly and
with the expected sign, meaning that increases in risk aversion are associated with appreciation
of the US dollar.13
Our second test of Hypothesis 2 involves estimating time-series regressions of the returns
from the ve global imbalance portfolios on the change in VXY. Remember that the long
(short) portfolio comprises the currencies with highest (lowest) net foreign liabilities and a
higher (lower) propensity to issue external liabilities in foreign currency. Hence Hypothesis 2
requires that the return on the long portfolio is negatively related to conditional FX volatility,
proxied by the change in VXY; by contrast the return on the short portfolio should be positively
related to the change in VXY. The results from estimating these regressions are reported in
Table 7 (both for excess returns and just the spot exchange rate component), and show a
decline (which is almost monotonic) in the coe¢ cients on the change in VXY as we move from
P1 and P5, as one would expect. However, the coe¢ cients for P1 and P2 are not statistically
di¤erent from zero, implying that the currencies of net creditors do not respond to shocks to
conditional volatility. The coe¢ cients for portfolios P3, P4 and P5 are negative and statistically
signicant, and they are largest for P5, implying that the currencies in the long portfolio of
the global imbalance strategy depreciate the most in bad times. Overall, the currencies issued
by the extreme net debtor countries with the highest propensity to issue liabilities in foreign
currency depreciate sharply in bad times relative to the currencies issued by the extreme net
creditor countries with the lowest propensity to issue liabilities in foreign currency. This result
term and the use of xed e¤ects, the interpretation of the regressions relates to how currency movements are
determined relative to the average currency movement in the sample.
13We also run similar panel regressions for excess returns rather than exchange rate returns, reported in
Table A.8 of the Internet Appendix, and nd consistent results.
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constitutes further supportive evidence for Hypothesis 2.
7 Further Analysis
In this section, we present additional exercises that further rene and corroborate the results
reported earlier.
Asset Pricing Tests on Other Cross-Sections of Returns. We now explore the
pricing power of the IMB factor using cross-sections of equity, bond and commodity portfolios
as test assets, and present our results in Table 8. In Panel A, we use the 25 equally-weighted
Fama-French global equity portfolios sorted on size and book-to-market as test assets and
nd that the IMB factor is priced after controlling for the Fama-French global equity factors,
i.e., market excess return (MKT ), size (SMB) and value (HML). Both IMB and bIMB are
highly statistically signicant, and the pricing errors are not statistically di¤erent from zero
according to the HJ test. In Panel B, we repeat the exercise using the 25 equally-weighted
Fama-French global equity portfolios sorted on size and momentum as test assets and the
global momentum (WML) factor in substitution of the global value factor, and nd very
similar results.14 In Panel C, we follow Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2012) and
sort international bonds of di¤erent maturities (1-3 years, 3-5 years, 5-7 years, 7-10 years,
>10 years) for 20 countries (including the US) into 5 equally-weighted portfolios depending
on their redemption yield. For this exercise we collect total return indices denominated in US
dollars from Datastream ranging from October 1983 to June 2014. We use these portfolios as
test assets and then control for an international bond factor (IBO) equivalent to buying the
last bond portfolio and selling the rst bond portfolio. In Panel D, we have obtained from
Yang (2013) 7 equally-weighted commodity portfolios sorted on the log di¤erence between the
12-month and the 1-month futures prices from October 1983 to December 2008. We use these
portfolios as test assets and the commodity factor as a control variable. In Panels C and D,
the global imbalance risk factor is priced with comparable estimates for the price of risk, while
the HJ distance measure is insignicant in both cases.
14The global equity portfolios as well as the global equity factors are obtained from Kenneth Frenchs
website, and are an updated version of those used in Fama and French (2012). The portfolios sorted on size
and book-to-market (momentum) range from July (November) 1990 to June 2014, and are constructed using
23 countries (including the US). In Table A.18 in the Internet Appendix, we also use the 25 equally-weighted
Fama-French global equity portfolios excluding the US, and nd qualitatively similar results.
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Since IMB is a tradable risk factor, its price of risk must equal its expected return. Thus,
in the above asset pricing tests we include the global imbalance factor as one of the test assets,
which e¤ectively means that we constrain IMB to be equal to the mean return of the IMB
factor.15 Moreover, the estimation results are qualitatively identical when using the Fama-
MacBeth procedure or two-stage GMM rather than rst-stage GMM. Overall, these results
suggest that global imbalance risk is priced in some of the most common cross-sections of
equities, international bonds and commodities.16
Independent Contribution of nfa and ldc. The global imbalance factor is constructed
by sequentially sorting currencies rst with respect to nfa, and then with respect to ldc. A
natural question to ask is whether the information in the global imbalance factor is driven
by nfa or ldc, or both. To address this point, we construct a factor that captures only the
information arising from nfa and a factor that summarizes only the signal coming from ldc.
We will refer to these factors as NFA and LDC, respectively. Figure A.1 in the Internet
Appendix reports a visual description of how we construct these factors. We use 6 portfolios,
except for the subset of developed countries where we are restricted to using only 4 portfolios.
At the end of each month, currencies are rst sorted in two baskets using nfa, and then in
three baskets using ldc. The NFA factor is computed as the average return on the low nfa
portfolios (P4, P5 and P6) minus the average return on the high nfa portfolios (P1, P2 and
P3), whereas the LDC factor is computed as the average return on the low ldc portfolios (P3
and P6) minus the average return on the high ldc portfolios (P1 and P4). We use a similar
procedure for the developed countries sample.
We report the summary statistics of these portfoliosexcess returns along with the NFA
and LDC factors in Table A.15 in the Internet Appendix. The excess return per unit of
volatility risk on both factors tends to be comparable when we inspect the subset of developed
15Note that if we relax this restriction and do not include the global imbalance factor as an additional
test asset, results remain qualitatively similar with an estimate of IMB which is higher and statistically
signicant. For instance, we nd IMB = 0:16 (with a standard error of 0:03) for the cross-section of global
equity portfolios sorted on size and book-to-market. Also, the HJ test remains statistically insignicant in all
cases.
16The asset pricing results in Table 3 suggested that the IMB factor prices the cross-section of currency
excess returns. However, we also execute asset pricing tests using only the ve carry portfolios as test assets.
The results, reported in Tables A.3 and Table A.4 in the Internet Appendix (with and without imposing the
constraint on the price of global imbalance risk), conrm that the IMB factor prices this cross section very
well.
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countries (the SR equals 0:34 for NFA and 0:38 for LDC). When we move away from
developed countries, the LDC factor tends to outperform the NFA factor: the LDC (NFA)
factor displays an SR of 0:78 (0:59) when we add the most liquid emerging market currencies
to the set of developed countries, and an SR of 0:71 (0:28) when we consider the full set of
currencies.17
Table A.16 in the Internet Appendix presents asset pricing tests based on a linear three-
factor model that includes the DOL, NFA and LDC factors. As test assets, we use the same
cross sections of currency portfolios used for the core asset pricing results in Table 3. The
results in Table A.16 show that the market price of risk is positive and statistically signicant
for both NFA and LDC when we focus on the broadest sample of all countries and the
intermediate sample of developed and emerging countries. Results for the subset of developed
countries suggest that the market price of risk is positive and statistically signicant for NFA,
but is not statistically signicant for LDC. This may be because the share of external liabilities
denominated in domestic currency is more homogenous across major economies, but shows
more cross-sectional variation as one expands the sample of countries to include emerging
markets. These results are the same for cross-sections that include the global imbalance
portfolios and the carry portfolios (Panel A) as well as for cross sections that do not (Panel
B). The R2 is reasonably high, and the HJ distance is not signicant.
Overall, the evidence in this section conrms that both sorting variables used in our global
imbalance strategy contribute to the price of global imbalance risk, and reect slightly di¤erent
aspects of risk. The sorting procedure used in the core analysis allows us to combine the
information in nfa and ldc in a simple fashion, and to construct a single risk factor that
captures these two di¤erent aspects of the evolution of global imbalances across countries.
Backlling data for ldc. Recall that data for ldc are only available from 1990 to 2012.
We backll the data to 1983 by keeping them constant at their 1990 values for all countries.
One may be concerned about the impact of this choice, and therefore we check the robustness
of this decision by starting the sample in January 1991 (given that ldc is available at the end
of Dec 1990). We then construct the global imbalance portfolios and the IMB factor. For
17Note that here we report summary statistics for portfolios gross of transaction costs. Otherwise, we would
need to report both long and short net positions for the same portfolio as NFA and LDC require di¤erent
combinations of long and short portfolios.
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the developed sample, we nd that the IMB factor has a mean return of 3:91 (t-stat = 2:54),
and SR = 0:53. For the sample of all countries, the mean return is 4:73 (t-stat = 2:84), and
SR = 0:69. The asset pricing results (reported in Table A.19 in the Internet Appendix) are
also qualitatively identical to the ones reported in our core analysis. In short, the results are
qualitatively identical when using a sample period that does not require backlling the ldc
data prior to 1990.
Further analysis. In further work, we analyze a variety of other issues. We only
briey discuss some of these exercises here. For example, we show that the IMB factor does a
reasonably good job at pricing the cross-section of individual currency excess returns (see Table
A.5 in the Internet Appendix). We also run calculations using alternative base currencies,
taking the viewpoint of a British, Japanese, Euro-based and Swiss investor; these results
indicate that, in each case, the global imbalance portfolio has similar return characteristics to
the ones reported in Table 1 (see Table A.10 in the Internet Appendix).18 We nd qualitatively
similar and quantitatively stronger results for a sample of countries where, using the latest
BIS Triennial Survey (BIS, 2013) we select the developed and most liquid emerging currencies
(see Tables A.11 and A.12 in the Internet Appendix). We name this sample developed and
emerging countries,which is an intermediate sample (in terms of size) between the two samples
analyzed in the paper till now.
8 Conclusions
The large and sudden depreciation of high-interest currencies in the aftermath of the Lehman
Brotherscollapse has revived interest in the risk-return prole of the foreign exchange market.
While the recent empirical literature has established that currency excess returns can be
understood as compensation for time-varying risk, it is silent about the economic determinants
underlying currency premia.
18This is comforting since it makes clear that the US does not play a key role in driving our results, which
are qualitatively identical regardless of whether the currency portfolios are dollar-neutral or not. Indeed, the
US may be seen as an interesting exception to our story in this paper, especially during the recent crisis,
because it is one of the largest external debtors in the world and yet it appreciated strongly during the crisis.
Part of the explanation may be that the US, which has a substantial currency mismatch on its balance sheet,
borrows in domestic currency and is generally considered a safe reserve currency (see Maggiori, 2013 for a
theoretical discussion of this reserve currency paradox).
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This paper tackles exactly this issue by shedding light on the macroeconomic forces driving
currency risk premia. Motivated by the theoretical insights of portfolio balance models of
exchange rate determination in incomplete nancial markets, we show that sorting currencies
on net foreign asset positions and a countrys propensity to issue external liabilities in domestic
currency generates a large spread in returns. In fact, a risk factor that captures exposure to
global imbalances and the currency denomination of external liabilities explains the bulk of
currency excess returns in a standard asset pricing model. The economic intuition for this
risk factor is simply that net debtor countries o¤er a currency risk premium to compensate
investors willing to nance negative external imbalances. This means that currency risk premia
are actually determined by two di¤erent, albeit related, channels: the rst is related to the
familiar interest rate di¤erential, and the second is related to the evolution of net foreign asset
positions and their currency of denomination.
We also show that, when global risk aversion spikes, net debtor nations experience a sharp
currency depreciation. Moreover, global imbalance risk appears to be priced pervasively, not
just in carry trade portfolios, but also in other cross-sections of currency returns as well as in
cross-sections of returns from other major asset markets.
Overall, we provide empirical support for the existence of a meaningful link between ex-
change rate returns and macroeconomic uctuations, uncovering a fundamental and theoreti-
cally motivated source of risk driving currency returns.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Global Imbalance Portfolios
The table presents descriptive statistics of currency portfolios sorted on the time t  1 net foreign asset position to gross domestic product (nfa), and
the share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency (ldc). The rst portfolio (P 1) contains the top 20% of all currencies with high nfa and high ldc (creditor
nations with external liabilities mainly in domestic currency) whereas the last portfolio (P 5) contains the top 20% of all currencies with low nfa and low
ldc (debtor nations with external liabilities mainly in foreign currency). IMB is a long-short strategy that buys P5 and sells P1. The table also reports the
rst order autocorrelation coe¢ cient (ac1), the annualized Sharpe ratio (SR), the maximum drawdown (mdd), the frequency of portfolio switches (freq),
the average forward discount or interest rate di¤erential relative to the US (fd), the average nfa, and the average ldc. t-statistics based on Newey and
West (1987) standard errors with Andrews (1991) optimal lag selection are reported in brackets. Excess returns are expressed in percentage per annum and
adjusted for transaction costs. The portfolios are rebalanced monthly and the sample runs from October 1983 to June 2014.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 IMB P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 IMB
All Countries Developed Countries
mean 0:92 3:51 1:40 3:57 5:32 4:40 0:67 2:45 3:06 3:46 4:65 3:98
t-stat [0:60] [2:18] [1:10] [2:39] [2:73] [3:51] [0:37] [1:31] [1:77] [2:00] [2:38] [3:26]
med 1:20 2:69 3:52 4:24 6:79 4:94 1:24 2:73 3:66 3:87 6:90 5:27
sdev 7:80 8:71 6:52 7:92 10:05 6:43 9:90 10:25 9:33 9:06 10:29 6:76
skew  0:16  0:03  0:86  0:48  0:27 0:17 0:05  0:07  0:26  0:16  0:28  0:53
kurt 3:56 3:95 6:42 5:49 4:36 6:17 3:56 3:27 3:90 6:08 3:66 5:17
ac1 0:08 0:05 0:09 0:06 0:08 0:09 0:06 0:02 0:05 0:08 0:06  0:01
SR 0:12 0:40 0:22 0:45 0:53 0:68 0:07 0:24 0:33 0:38 0:45 0:59
mdd 0:46 0:29 0:33 0:26 0:30 0:20 0:54 0:36 0:34 0:32 0:31 0:26
freq 0:03 0:04 0:04 0:04 0:03 0:02 0:02 0:02 0:02 0:03
fd  0:54 1:20 2:02 3:50 6:80  1:32  0:76 1:81 2:15 2:23
nfa 0:43 0:14 0:10  0:46  0:56 0:41 0:31 0:04  0:37  0:37
ldc 0:63 0:47 0:44 0:47 0:28 0:61 0:46 0:48 0:49 0:34
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Table 2. Time-Series Regressions
The table presents time-series regression estimates. In Panel A, we regress the global imbalance factors
excess returns (IMBt) on the carry trade factors excess returns (CARt). In Panel B, we regress the excess
returns of the global imbalance portfolios (RXi;t for i = 1; 2; : : : ; 5) on the carry trade factors excess returns.
We also control for the lagged 1-year dependent variable as external imbalance information is gathered once a
year. The global imbalance portfolios are sorted on the time t  1 net foreign asset position to gross domestic
product (nfa), and the share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency (ldc). The rst portfolio (P 1) contains
the top 20% of all currencies with high nfa and high ldc (creditor nations with external liabilities mainly in
domestic currency) whereas the last portfolio (P 5) contains the top 20% of all currencies with low nfa and
low ldc (debtor nations with external liabilities mainly in foreign currency). IMB is a long-short strategy
that buys P5 and sells P1. CAR denotes a long-short strategy that buys high yielding currencies and sells low
yielding currencies. Newey and West (1987) standard errors with Andrews (1991) optimal lag selection are
reported in parentheses. F(;) denotes the F-test for the null hypothesis that  = 0 and  = 1 (with p-values
in brackets). Excess returns are expressed in percentage per annum, and adjusted for transaction costs. The
portfolios are rebalanced monthly and the sample runs from October 1983 to June 2014.
Panel A: IMBt = + CARt + IMBt 12 + "t
RXt   R
2 F(;)    R
2 F(;)
All Countries
IMBt 2:30 0:41 0:30 [< :01] 1:98 0:41 0:07 0:30 [< :01]
(1:00) (0:05) (0:96) (0:05) (0:07)
Developed Countries
IMBt 1:97 0:39 0:39 [< :01] 1:83 0:39 0:04 0:39 [< :01]
(0:92) (0:04) (0:91) (0:04) (0:04)
Panel B: RXi;t = + CARt + RXi;t 12 + "t
  R2    R2
All Countries
RX1;t 2:57  0:15 0:02 2:59  0:15  0:01 0:02
(1:59) (0:07) (1:60) (0:07) (0:05)
RX2;t 4:98  0:11 0:01 5:00  0:11  0:01 0:01
(1:72) (0:07) (1:74) (0:07) (0:05)
RX3;t 0:84 0:15 0:03 0:92 0:15  0:06 0:04
(1:32) (0:05) (1:29) (0:05) (0:06)
RX4;t 3:13 0:16 0:02 3:25 0:16  0:03 0:02
(1:53) (0:05) (1:48) (0:05) (0:05)
RX5;t 4:87 0:26 0:05 5:23 0:26  0:06 0:05
(1:91) (0:09) (1:92) (0:09) (0:06)
Developed Countries
RX1;t 2:14  0:16 0:03 2:14  0:16  0:01 0:03
(1:91) (0:07) (1:92) (0:07) (0:05)
RX2;t 3:64  0:09 0:01 3:75  0:09  0:05 0:01
(1:97) (0:08) (1:96) (0:08) (0:05)
RX3;t 2:78 0:20 0:06 3:00 0:20  0:07 0:06
(1:69) (0:06) (1:66) (0:06) (0:05)
RX4;t 2:51 0:31 0:14 2:70 0:31  0:05 0:14
(1:64) (0:07) (1:60) (0:07) (0:05)
RX5;t 4:11 0:23 0:06 4:05 0:23 0:01 0:05
(1:91) (0:07) (1:92) (0:07) (0:05)
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Table 3. Asset Pricing Tests: Currency Strategies
The table presents asset pricing results for currency strategies sorted on time t   1 information. The test assets include 5 carry trade (sorted on
the 1-month forward discounts), 5 global imbalance (sorted on the net foreign asset position and the share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency), 5
short-term momentum (sorted on the past three-month exchange rate returns), 5 long-term momentum (sorted on the past 1-year exchange rate returns), 5
value (sorted on the past 5-years real exchange rate returns), 5 slope (sorted on the term spread of interest rates), 5 long yields (sorted on long-term interest
rate di¤erentials), 5 risk reversal (sorted on the 25-delta 1-year currency risk reversal), and 5 volatility risk premium (sorted on the di¤erence between the
1-year lagged realized volatility and model-free implied volatility) portfolios, for a total of 9 strategies and 45 portfolios. The set of pricing factors includes
the dollar (DOL), the global imbalance (IMB) and carry trade (CAR) factors. We report rst-stage GMM estimates of the factor loadings b, the market
price of risk , and the cross-sectional R2. Newey and West (1987) standard errors with Andrews (1991) optimal lag selection are reported in parentheses.
HJ denotes the Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) distance (with simulated p-value in brackets) for the null hypothesis that the HJ distance is equal to
zero. Excess returns are in annual terms and adjusted for transaction costs. The portfolios are rebalanced monthly and the sample runs from October 1983
to June 2014 (for risk reversal and the volatility risk premium portfolios the sample runs from January 1996). Panel A employs 45 (35) portfolios as test
assets when the sample runs from October 1983 (January 1996). Panel B employs 35 (25) portfolios as test assets when the sample runs from October
1983 (January 1996) as we exclude the 5 carry trade and the 5 global imbalance portfolios.
Panel A: with Carry Trade and Global Imbalance Portfolios as Test Assets
bDOL bIMB bCAR DOL IMB CAR R
2 HJ
All Countries: 10/1983 06/2014
0:12 (0:27) 0:92 (0:40) 0:02 (0:01) 0:05 (0:01) 0:49 0:81 [0:19]
0:32 (0:29) 0:54 (0:26) 0:02 (0:01) 0:05 (0:01) 0:46 0:81 [0:19]
0:19 (0:27) 0:59 (0:41) 0:22 (0:32) 0:02 (0:01) 0:04 (0:01) 0:04 (0:01) 0:50 0:81 [0:21]
All Countries: 01/1996 06/2014
 0:11 (0:43) 1:41 (0:44) 0:02 (0:01) 0:08 (0:01) 0:65 0:91 [0:94]
0:14 (0:41) 1:12 (0:40) 0:02 (0:01) 0:07 (0:01) 0:63 0:91 [0:94]
 0:02 (0:43) 0:81 (0:46) 0:55 (0:54) 0:02 (0:01) 0:07 (0:01) 0:07 (0:01) 0:68 0:91 [0:94]
Developed Countries: 10/1983 06/2014
0:19 (0:23) 0:74 (0:42) 0:02 (0:02) 0:04 (0:01) 0:58 0:65 [0:48]
0:22 (0:23) 0:34 (0:21) 0:02 (0:02) 0:05 (0:02) 0:58 0:66 [0:40]
0:20 (0:23) 0:44 (0:32) 0:15 (0:23) 0:02 (0:02) 0:03 (0:01) 0:05 (0:02) 0:60 0:65 [0:50]
Developed Countries: 01/1996 06/2014
 0:12 (0:33) 0:75 (0:42) 0:01 (0:02) 0:05 (0:01) 0:52 0:80 [0:99]
 0:01 (0:31) 0:40 (0:28) 0:01 (0:02) 0:05 (0:02) 0:41 0:80 [0:99]
 0:15 (0:35) 1:17 (0:48)  0:28 (0:33) 0:01 (0:02) 0:06 (0:01) 0:04 (0:02) 0:54 0:80 [0:99]
Continued
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Table 3. Asset Pricing Tests: Currency Strategies (continued)
Panel B: without Carry Trade and Global Imbalance Portfolios as Test Assets
bDOL bIMB bCAR DOL IMB CAR R
2 HJ
All Countries: 10/1983 06/2014
0:13 (0:27) 0:84 (0:34) 0:02 (0:01) 0:04 (0:01) 0:37 0:38 [0:57]
0:30 (0:28) 0:54 (0:25) 0:02 (0:01) 0:05 (0:01) 0:36 0:41 [0:34]
0:16 (0:27) 0:67 (0:34) 0:22 (0:29) 0:02 (0:01) 0:04 (0:01) 0:04 (0:02) 0:43 0:41 [0:41]
All Countries: 01/1996 06/2014
 0:09 (0:41) 1:28 (0:36) 0:02 (0:01) 0:07 (0:01) 0:71 0:60 [0:90]
0:12 (0:40) 1:10 (0:37) 0:02 (0:01) 0:07 (0:01) 0:68 0:62 [0:85]
 0:04 (0:41) 0:85 (0:40) 0:55 (0:48) 0:02 (0:01) 0:07 (0:01) 0:07 (0:01) 0:77 0:62 [0:83]
Developed Countries: 10/1983 06/2014
0:19 (0:23) 0:70 (0:36) 0:02 (0:02) 0:04 (0:01) 0:36 0:27 [0:97]
0:21 (0:22) 0:31 (0:19) 0:02 (0:02) 0:05 (0:02) 0:47 0:26 [0:95]
0:19 (0:22) 0:51 (0:30) 0:12 (0:20) 0:02 (0:02) 0:04 (0:01) 0:05 (0:02) 0:47 0:28 [0:96]
Developed Countries: 01/1996 06/2014
 0:12 (0:33) 0:74 (0:37) 0:01 (0:02) 0:05 (0:01) 0:51 0:43 [0:99]
0:01 (0:30) 0:35 (0:27) 0:01 (0:02) 0:05 (0:02) 0:38 0:44 [0:99]
 0:13 (0:34) 1:01 (0:43)  0:20 (0:31) 0:01 (0:02) 0:06 (0:01) 0:04 (0:02) 0:55 0:44 [0:99]
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Table 4. Forward Discounts and Global Imbalances
The table presents results from cross-sectional regressions of the average forward discount (or interest rate di¤erential relative to the US) on the average
(i) net foreign asset position to gross domestic product (nfa), (ii) share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency (ldc), (iii) ination di¤erential relative to
the US, (iv) output gap, and (v) a constant. Corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. The sample runs at monthly frequency from October
1983 to June 2014.
Dependent variable: forward discount
(1) (2) (3) (4)
nfa  0:141  0:075  0:127  0:072
(0:036) (0:017) (0:037) (0:017)
ldc  0:221 0:089  0:302 0:064
(0:465) (0:169) (0:482) (0:169)
ination di¤erential 0:969 0:959
(0:043) (0:045)
output gap 0:074 0:021
(0:033) (0:009)
constant 0:298  0:209 0:349  0:190
(0:253) (0:082) (0:265) (0:083)
Adjusted R2 0:05 0:86 0:07 0:86
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Table 5. Portfolios Sorted on Betas
The table presents descriptive statistics of -sorted currency portfolios. Each  is obtained by regressing individual currency excess returns on the
global imbalance risk factor using a 36-month moving window that ends in period t   1. The rst portfolio (P 1) contains the top 20% of all currencies
with the lowest betas whereas the last portfolio (P 5) contains the top 20% of all currencies with the highest betas. H=L denotes a long-short strategy that
buys P 5 and sells P 1. Excess returns are expressed in percentage per annum. The table also reports the rst order autocorrelation coe¢ cient (ac1), the
annualized Sharpe ratio (SR), the maximum drawdown (mdd), the frequency of portfolio switches (freq), the average net foreign asset position to gross
domestic product (nfa), the share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency (ldc), the pre- and post-formation forward discount or interest rate di¤erential
relative to the US (fd), the pre-formation s (with standard deviations in parentheses) and the post-formation s (with standard errors in parentheses).
t-statistics based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors with Andrews (1991) optimal lag selection are reported in brackets. The portfolios are
rebalanced monthly and the sample runs from October 1983 to June 2014.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 H=L P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 H=L
All Countries Developed Countries
mean  0:54 2:18 3:85 3:10 4:67 5:21  1:02 3:61 2:47 2:33 4:92 5:93
t-stat [ 0:38] [1:49] [2:39] [1:59] [2:38] [2:83] [ 0:51] [1:80] [1:31] [1:40] [2:33] [2:76]
med  0:29 2:47 3:53 4:53 4:27 5:79  1:23 3:18 5:25 3:51 6:77 6:94
sdev 6:62 7:62 8:18 9:10 9:61 9:11 9:74 10:29 9:25 8:51 10:59 10:79
skew 0:17 0:13  0:59  0:42  0:43  0:30 0:01  0:06  0:36  0:26  0:32  0:31
kurt 3:90 3:98 5:56 4:18 4:77 3:55 3:65 3:98 3:71 4:07 5:28 4:37
ac1 0:13 0:03 0:09 0:15 0:12 0:11 0:11 0:05 0:11 0:06 0:09 0:07
SR  0:08 0:29 0:47 0:34 0:49 0:57  0:10 0:35 0:27 0:27 0:46 0:55
mdd 0:49 0:35 0:18 0:30 0:26 0:20 0:65 0:36 0:30 0:27 0:33 0:42
freq 0:10 0:14 0:15 0:14 0:07 0:17 0:10 0:15 0:13 0:10 0:04 0:14
nfa 0:45  0:03  0:02  0:11  0:41 0:47 0:28  0:04  0:18  0:49
ldc 0:53 0:50 0:48 0:46 0:41 0:57 0:49 0:47 0:46 0:46
pre-fd  0:36 0:55 2:13 2:60 4:30  1:53  0:02 0:89 1:45 3:04
post-fd  0:35 0:56 2:11 2:59 4:24  1:51 0:00 0:84 1:43 3:04
pre-  0:22 0:14 0:51 0:78 1:35  0:94  0:50  0:28 0:05 0:67
(0:35) (0:47) (0:66) (0:76) (0:76) (0:97) (0:96) (0:88) (0:67) (0:57)
post-  0:06 0:03 0:28 0:46 0:69  0:29 0:13 0:30 0:35 0:82
(0:08) (0:09) (0:12) (0:15) (0:13) (0:09) (0:12) (0:10) (0:09) (0:10)
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Table 6. Determinants of Spot Exchange Rate Returns
The table presents results from xed-e¤ects panel regressions. We use discrete exchange rate returns at monthly frequency as the dependent variable.
Exchange rates are dened as units of US dollars per unit of foreign currency such that a positive return denotes a foreign currency appreciation. The set
of independent variables includes the net foreign asset position to gross domestic product (nfa), the share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency (ldc),
the forward discount or interest rate di¤erential relative to the US (fd), the monthly change in JP Morgans VXY index (V XY ), and a dummy variable
that equals one if V XY is greater than one standard deviation as estimated across the entire sample, and zero otherwise (V XY dummy). The VXY
tracks aggregate implied volatility in foreign exchange markets. Robust standard errors are clustered at country level and are reported in parentheses. The
superscripts a, b and c denote statistical signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The sample runs at monthly frequency from June 1992 to
June 2014.
Dependent variable: nominal exchange rate returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
nfa (lagged 12 months) 0:026 0:015 0:038  0:092  0:113  0:088
(0:090) (0:090) (0:093) (0:105) (0:104) (0:104)
V XY  0:544c  0:544c  0:527c
(0:074) (0:074) (0:085)
V XY  nfa (lagged 12 months) 0:269c 0:269c 0:258c
(0:073) (0:073) (0:070)
ldc (lagged 12 months) 0:285 0:019 0:562 0:380
(0:325) (0:292) (0:347) (0:308)
fd (lagged 1 month)  0:003  0:002
(0:002) (0:003)
V XY  fd (lagged 1 month)  0:001
(0:001)
V XY dummy  1:199c  1:204c  1:108c
(0:216) (0:217) (0:241)
V XY dummy  nfa (lagged 12 months) 0:678c 0:678c 0:622c
(0:190) (0:190) (0:183)
V XY dummy  fd (lagged 1 month)  0:005
(0:004)
Additional Variables: Constant and lagged exchange rate returns Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES Y ES
Adjusted R2 0:06 0:06 0:06 0:02 0:02 0:03
Observations 7568 7568 7568 7568 7568 7568
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Table 7. Risk Bearing Capacity and Global Imbalance Portfolios
This table presents results from time-series regressions. In Panel A, we regress monthly currency excess returns to the global imbalance portfolios (see
Table 1) on a constant and the monthly changes in the V XY index. In Panel B, we regress the exchange rate return component to the global imbalance
portfolios on a constant and the monthly changes in the V XY index. Newey and West (1987) standard errors with Andrews (1991) optimal lag selection
are reported in parentheses. The sample runs at monthly frequency from June 1992 to June 2014.
Panel A: Currency Excess Returns
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
V XY  0:091  0:193  0:689c  0:600c  0:714c
(0:211) (0:190) (0:158) (0:226) (0:181)
Constant 0:011 0:217a 0:058 0:320b 0:406b
(0:130) (0:128) (0:128) (0:143) (0:176)
Adjusted R2  0:00 0:01 0:14 0:08 0:08
Panel B: Spot Exchange Rate Returns
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
V XY  0:074  0:180  0:684c  0:585c  0:706c
(0:216) (0:190) (0:160) (0:224) (0:181)
Constant 0:009 0:080  0:099 0:033  0:258
(0:127) (0:129) (0:130) (0:146) (0:178)
Adjusted R2  0:00 0:01 0:14 0:08 0:08
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Table 8. Asset Pricing Tests: Equity, Bond, and Commodity Strategies
The table presents asset pricing results for international equity, international bond and commodity strate-
gies. The test assets include the 25 equally-weighted global equity portfolios formed on size and book-to-market
(momentum) from Fama and French (2012) in Panel A (Panel B), the 5 equally-weighted international bond
portfolios sorted on the redemption yields from Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2012) in Panel C,
and the 7 equally-weighted commodity portfolios sorted on the log di¤erence between the 12-month and the
1-month futures prices from Yang (2013) in Panel D. The risk factors include the dollar factor (DOL), global
imbalance factor (IMB), the Fama-French global factors (MKT , SMB, HML, and WML), the high-minus-
low international bond factor (IBO), and the high-minus-low commodity factor (COM). We report rst-stage
GMM estimates of the factor loadings b, the market price of risk , and the cross-sectional R2. Newey and West
(1987) standard errors with Andrews (1991) optimal lag selection are reported in parentheses. HJ denotes
the Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) distance (with simulated p-value in brackets) for the null hypothesis that
the HJ distance is equal to zero. Excess returns are in annual terms and not adjusted for transaction costs
(except for DOL and IMB).
Panel A: Size and Book-to-Market Global Portfolios
DOL IMB MKT SMB HML R2 HJ
b 0:18 0:88 0:16 0:60 0:85 0:62 0:63
(0:43) (0:32) (0:21) (0:36) (0:31) [0:67]
 0:04 0:06 0:07 0:03 0:06
(0:01) (0:01) (0:02) (0:01) (0:02)
Panel B: Size and Momentum Global Portfolios
DOL IMB MKT SMB WML R2 HJ
b 1:29 0:86  0:04 0:71 0:40 0:64 0:56
(0:58) (0:40) (0:21) (0:46) (0:26) [0:83]
 0:08 0:06 0:09 0:06 0:08
(0:01) (0:01) (0:02) (0:01) (0:02)
Panel C: International Bond Portfolios
DOL IMB IBO R2 HJ
b  0:06 0:99 2:70 0:94 0:09
(0:30) (0:31) (0:49) [0:54]
 0:01 0:05 0:08
(0:01) (0:01) (0:01)
Panel D: Commodity Portfolios
DOL IMB COM R2 0:06
b 0:78 0:77 0:20 0:75 [0:94]
(1:53) (0:43) (0:09)
 0:06 0:05 0:11
(0:05) (0:02) (0:04)
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Figure 1. Construction of the Global Imbalance Risk Factor
This figure describes the construction of the global imbalance (IMB) risk factor. At the end of each month, currencies are first grouped into 2 baskets using the
median value of the net foreign asset to GDP ratio (nfa), and then into 3 baskets using the share of foreign liabilities in domestic currency (ldc). The ldc breakpoints
are the 20th and 60th (40th and 80th) percentiles for the high (low) nfa portfolios. The first portfolio (P1) contains the top 20% of all currencies with high nfa and
high ldc (creditor nations with external liabilities denominated mainly in domestic currency) whereas the last portfolio (P5) contains the top 20% of all currencies
with low nfa and low ldc (debtor nations with external liabilities denominated mainly in foreign currency). The portfolios P
′
3 and P
′′
3 are intermediate portfolios
each containing 10% of all currencies which are then aggregated into Portfolio P3. The global imbalance factor (IMB) is constructed as the excess return on P5
minus the excess return on P1. We use 5 portfolios due to a limited number of currencies. Figure A.1 in the Internet Appendix describes the construction of the
IMB factor based on 6 (4) portfolios for All Countries (Developed Countries).
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